kristalsoldier
New member
OK. So here is a bit more of an explanation (and eventual rationalization). First, take a look at this:
Source: Satya Nadella Explains the "Mobile" in "Mobile First, Cloud First" | Mobile content from Windows IT Pro
Thurrott then goes on to quote the MS CEO:
Source: Same as above.
If you stop for a moment to think about it, it would appear that the MS CEO is trying to take MS back to its roots, that is, to be a pure software company. Just think about that for a minute. In the PC space, MS did not (and does not) care whether you use a ThinkPad or an Acer or a Dell or an Asus. They are simply interested in what drives the hardware, which is Windows.
The dominance that MS experienced in the PC space could not be replicated in the mobile space for a variety of reasons. One of these reasons was the complacency that had set into MS as a company. The mobile space posed (and continues to pose) a strategic problem for MS. First, they don't have the command over the space as they did (and arguably continue to do) in the PC space. Second, with Apple and Android focusing on apps and alternate distribution channels for apps, MS suddenly found themselves caught on the wrong foot on two counts - first, they did not have an adequate (some would argue, relevant) OS and second, they had no apps. Their attempt to shoehorn an existing OS (Windows CE, I think it was at one point) as a mobile OS was a disaster when they were suddenly confronted by Apple with iOS and later by Google with Android. Suddenly, MS found themselves losing the battle for mindshare - mind you, mindshare because in the enterprise space, no one could (and still can) challenge MS.
Then came a couple of disastrous decisions. First, the powers that be at MS decided that to make its presence felt in the mobile space a hardware component was necessary. And since MS is not strapped for cash, they hunted down Nokia. Now they had a hardware capability. Second, MS decided on developing a mobile OS. In my opinion, the second decision was better than the first because if they could convince their partner OEMS that they (MS) would bear the development costs for a mobile OS, then pushing out the OS through those OEMs would make a difference. But there were a number of preconditions (some of which MS has only lately recognized). The first of these was the decision to give away the OS (which they have effectively done now). In this they took a page out of Google's book. Same principle, but executed differently. But having invested in a hardware capability and probably driven by the need to show a positive ROI, they had to push their own hardware. This was and remains a problem. Why? Because MS hardware is an in-house product and carries with it significant prestige value. An alternative would have been to treat the Nokia acquisition as being a co-incidental event and a platform simply to showcase the OS and to produce limited reference designs (again, this is a Google model with the acquisition of Motorola). In addition to this, they could have used Nokia patents to augment the capabilities of their partner OEMs (for a fee, of course). But MS did not choose this option. As a consequence, they built up a small and dedicated fan following (me included) but they also attracted the attention of tech pundits and bloggers who have been less than kind to them and the negative fallout has also had an effect.
As all this was going on, MS found (and finds) that their original PC model of having their software on a wide variety OEMs was falling by the wayside in the mobile space. Recall the "devices and services" mantra? That was the last rallying cry for justifying the Nokia acquisition and for the Surface line (which at that time was seriously floundering). Then comes Satya Nadella who probably - with a lot of help from the MS board - decides to take MS back to its roots. And what are those roots? Have MS software on every platform possible. Nadella understands that the mobile space is an expanding one and it will be so in the foreseeable future. He wants MS software on all devices that are populating this space. In this scheme of things, Windows Phone is actually irrelevant (as the text of his interview suggests). Thus, the push to have the cutting edge MS apps on the dominant platform. In effect, MS is not playing the mobile hardware game, but they are playing the mobile game. Thus the current mantra "cloud first, mobile first".
Two questions remain: (1) What about the Surface line? And (2) what about Windows 10?
The Surface - particularly, the SP3 - will probably serve as a reference design and a platform to showcase cutting edge MS apps. It will also be a niche product - both in the consumer and enterprise space, but it will not take on the role of a being a critical product in MS' scheme of things. Windows 10 has, in my opinion, a dual purpose - (1) to transform the hitherto PC-centric mindset of the enterprise and consumer space (this is, to put it tongue-in-cheek, MS' "transformational" gambit) and (2) if MS continues to give away its mobile OS freely to its partner OEMs, then we can expect the mobile component of Windows 10 to also be given away for free. By doing this MS opens up a one-half front war in the mobile space - the half front is a defensive war that MS is (or will wage). This will involve a mobile-oriented OS which it will give away for free to its OEM partners. The full front is an offensive war where MS will attempt to dominate the application market (in a targeted way) across platforms.
Where does this leave the small group of Windows Mobile OS enthusiasts like me/ us? Nowhere really. I'd like to sue MS for wasting my money on two generations of phones - the latest being the 830. My only consolation is that the 830 is the swan song of an excellent hardware company (Nokia) and for me that is important. But come October, if what I have written above holds true, I will be looking at some other eco-system (or maybe not).
My apologies for this very long post!
In an appearance at an annual luncheon at the Seattle Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce—which was nicely transcribed by Geekwire's Todd Bishop, thank you very much—Mr. Nadella was asked what he was doing to improve Windows Phone's market share, which is in the very low single digits and shows no signs of improving anytime soon.
Nadella didn't talk about "making the market" for Windows Phone. He didn't explain that many new hardware partners have signed on with Windows Phone thanks to "zero dollar" licensing in 2014, and that their devices would improve matters. He didn't vaguely speak of future synergies between Windows Phone and "big" Windows. Instead, he offered up a surprising response.
He said that Windows Phone's market share doesn't matter.
He said that Microsoft's broader goal is to deliver productivity experiences across all of the devices that people use. That you will find "Microsoft icons"—i.e. apps—on any phone. The goal, he said, was to ensure that platforms like Office, Skype, and others are broadly available everywhere.
Source: Satya Nadella Explains the "Mobile" in "Mobile First, Cloud First" | Mobile content from Windows IT Pro
Thurrott then goes on to quote the MS CEO:
Devices and device sizes will come and go, even within a single year, you will be changing multiple phones," he said. "It's more about the mobility. In fact, if there's anything central to our vision, it's don't think of the device at the center, think of the individual, the people at the center. And then have the platforms and productivity experiences get built with that at the center.
So you will have many devices, you will have small devices, large devices, and devices that have not yet been created that will come in time. But what's going to be the constant? Your digital memories, your productivity experiences across all of those devices. That's really the center of how we think about innovating today and into the future.
And also we are very grounded on this cross-platform world. One of the things that you'll find is Microsoft icons on any phone—irrespective of whether it's a Windows Phone or not. That's our core goal: Things like Office, things like Skype are broadly available
Source: Same as above.
If you stop for a moment to think about it, it would appear that the MS CEO is trying to take MS back to its roots, that is, to be a pure software company. Just think about that for a minute. In the PC space, MS did not (and does not) care whether you use a ThinkPad or an Acer or a Dell or an Asus. They are simply interested in what drives the hardware, which is Windows.
The dominance that MS experienced in the PC space could not be replicated in the mobile space for a variety of reasons. One of these reasons was the complacency that had set into MS as a company. The mobile space posed (and continues to pose) a strategic problem for MS. First, they don't have the command over the space as they did (and arguably continue to do) in the PC space. Second, with Apple and Android focusing on apps and alternate distribution channels for apps, MS suddenly found themselves caught on the wrong foot on two counts - first, they did not have an adequate (some would argue, relevant) OS and second, they had no apps. Their attempt to shoehorn an existing OS (Windows CE, I think it was at one point) as a mobile OS was a disaster when they were suddenly confronted by Apple with iOS and later by Google with Android. Suddenly, MS found themselves losing the battle for mindshare - mind you, mindshare because in the enterprise space, no one could (and still can) challenge MS.
Then came a couple of disastrous decisions. First, the powers that be at MS decided that to make its presence felt in the mobile space a hardware component was necessary. And since MS is not strapped for cash, they hunted down Nokia. Now they had a hardware capability. Second, MS decided on developing a mobile OS. In my opinion, the second decision was better than the first because if they could convince their partner OEMS that they (MS) would bear the development costs for a mobile OS, then pushing out the OS through those OEMs would make a difference. But there were a number of preconditions (some of which MS has only lately recognized). The first of these was the decision to give away the OS (which they have effectively done now). In this they took a page out of Google's book. Same principle, but executed differently. But having invested in a hardware capability and probably driven by the need to show a positive ROI, they had to push their own hardware. This was and remains a problem. Why? Because MS hardware is an in-house product and carries with it significant prestige value. An alternative would have been to treat the Nokia acquisition as being a co-incidental event and a platform simply to showcase the OS and to produce limited reference designs (again, this is a Google model with the acquisition of Motorola). In addition to this, they could have used Nokia patents to augment the capabilities of their partner OEMs (for a fee, of course). But MS did not choose this option. As a consequence, they built up a small and dedicated fan following (me included) but they also attracted the attention of tech pundits and bloggers who have been less than kind to them and the negative fallout has also had an effect.
As all this was going on, MS found (and finds) that their original PC model of having their software on a wide variety OEMs was falling by the wayside in the mobile space. Recall the "devices and services" mantra? That was the last rallying cry for justifying the Nokia acquisition and for the Surface line (which at that time was seriously floundering). Then comes Satya Nadella who probably - with a lot of help from the MS board - decides to take MS back to its roots. And what are those roots? Have MS software on every platform possible. Nadella understands that the mobile space is an expanding one and it will be so in the foreseeable future. He wants MS software on all devices that are populating this space. In this scheme of things, Windows Phone is actually irrelevant (as the text of his interview suggests). Thus, the push to have the cutting edge MS apps on the dominant platform. In effect, MS is not playing the mobile hardware game, but they are playing the mobile game. Thus the current mantra "cloud first, mobile first".
Two questions remain: (1) What about the Surface line? And (2) what about Windows 10?
The Surface - particularly, the SP3 - will probably serve as a reference design and a platform to showcase cutting edge MS apps. It will also be a niche product - both in the consumer and enterprise space, but it will not take on the role of a being a critical product in MS' scheme of things. Windows 10 has, in my opinion, a dual purpose - (1) to transform the hitherto PC-centric mindset of the enterprise and consumer space (this is, to put it tongue-in-cheek, MS' "transformational" gambit) and (2) if MS continues to give away its mobile OS freely to its partner OEMs, then we can expect the mobile component of Windows 10 to also be given away for free. By doing this MS opens up a one-half front war in the mobile space - the half front is a defensive war that MS is (or will wage). This will involve a mobile-oriented OS which it will give away for free to its OEM partners. The full front is an offensive war where MS will attempt to dominate the application market (in a targeted way) across platforms.
Where does this leave the small group of Windows Mobile OS enthusiasts like me/ us? Nowhere really. I'd like to sue MS for wasting my money on two generations of phones - the latest being the 830. My only consolation is that the 830 is the swan song of an excellent hardware company (Nokia) and for me that is important. But come October, if what I have written above holds true, I will be looking at some other eco-system (or maybe not).
My apologies for this very long post!