I love my WP and have no pland to switch. Even if MS left the mobile space I would still buy used WP phones.
I have followed several ex Microsoft employee and Nokia employeees for over a year now and have just exsorbed their comments. Filtering out the rants from solid information (no need to throw out the baby with the bath water)
I am not a writer but that's please excuse the sentence fragments and poor grammar as I write code all day and comment in broken english
I WILL supply links, sources and references to my editorial as I think its vital and add some measure of credibility to my thinking. If you see something that needs links right away please let me know. If I can't find it I will let you know
This editorial has everything to do with up and coming phones...and more specifically a Surface Phone from MS. I have links for all my points but it make take awhile to embed them
Overview | Quick Summary
It makes perfect sense for MS to produce a surface phone in light of the fact that Stephen Elop tenure at Nokia maybe short lived. He may not make it till fall 2013. The next CEO of Nokia will have to take an objective look at Nokia and would make choices that may not be in the best interest of MS. I believe that MS is aware of this. MS cannot wait until this happens but must be proactive in getting ready for that inevitable day. I call this minimizing their dependency on Nokia which may go into a different direction in the future.
Secondly,for the future of MS, it has to be a major player in the mobile arena as it will be revenue generator as PC sales diminish over time.
stop reading now unless you want to torture yourself
Nokia's Current Status
In 2009, Nokia sales were trending down ( 19% from 2008). Market share decreased from 40% to 37% and they saw based upon 2008 & 2009 sales where they were headed. So they brought in a new CEO Stephen Elop to change the direction of the company. After arriving at Nokia he drew some conclusion, Nokia's problems were ecosystems based and not execution based (time to market). So he looked at all the mobile ecosystem available and decided that Nokia future would should be with the MS's WP operating system versus keeping MeeGo and not adopting Android. I personally like the idea of using WP as the primary OS as Android was crowded. Even a former disgruntle Nokia executive Lee Williams had to agree that this was the right choice saying
"I did not, and still do not see any benefits to Nokia embracing Android," he tells me.
There are lots of problem with Android from Nokia's perspective, according to Williams -- not least the fact Google's own business aims are in conflict with Nokia's need to establish a distinctive software ecosystem of its own.
"Android is a less capable offering than a few options that still exist within Nokia," argues Williams. "It's certainly not what I would refer to as an open system. More than that, I think that Nokia has little opportunity to differentiate here in the near term, and the Android platform is so highly fragmented that returns on investment become difficult at best for an ecosystem participant.
Stephen Elop's failure as a CEO was not picking WP but having the all or nothing approach. As WP customer, I love the laser like focus on WP! As a shareholder of Nokia, the plan was too risky. The plan had to be perfectly executed or else the hoard of cash $18billion had would soon disappear ($12.4 as of March 2012). The biggest risk with the all or nothing approach is....the revenue stream. Where would Nokia receive revenue while they ramped up their WP offering? Elop did not adequately gauge this risk. A wiser choice would have been to continue offering the same products they had been (even though sales were trending down ) offering to have income/profits coming in and WHEN WP became a dominate player...cut off all the products. This approach has risk but much less than diving all in.
At the top of 2010, Elop sent the famous burning platform memo that was done with good intention but it effectively Osborned all of Nokia products. He should have known better that memo would leak out! So in Feb 2010, he told customers (indirectly) that they were ditching their current product line (and customers were scared away from buying their current products...i.e the definition of osborne effect ) and WP wasn't ready. I repeat, he told customers indirectly that their current products were no good...yet he had no product to replace it...a recipe for disaster! Hence, Nokia revenue and profits took a MAJOR hit. It's like quitting your day job to start your own business and not having a salary to support you. Your saving could only carry you so far. If executed perfectly, you could quit your day job and start a small business but there are tremendous risks involved...big RISKS, such as running out of savings and losing cars and homes. (note to self, start small business on the side until sales trends justifies telling your boss to shove it)
From his announcement in Feb/2010 to Oct/2011 Nokia had no WP to sell to generate any revenue and their stock took a hit because of lots revenue! Get this, it took them 20 months to produce the first WP after the burning memo. Nokia's biggest problem up until then was time to market. They would announce a product and it would take them months to produce it (see N7, N8) and this corporate culture continued with the WP phones.
From a financial standpoint Nokia should have continued to sell the N9, a new N10 and new N12 until sales of WP justified cutting off all other product lines. I am sure there were problems with resource allocation where they did not have the man power or $$ to fund multiple products...but this approach would have still allowed them to bring in some profits AND keep their cash hoard.
Imagine McDonalds fries and burgers sales were trending down b/c of consumers wanting healthier food and some McDonald exec told customer that they were no longer going to sell the unhealthy fries and cheeseburgers as they were bad for them, Yet had no health alternative foods ready to sell. The revenue stream would tank as fries and burgers produce revenue and profits no matter how bad they were! When the market proved that healthy foods were revenue generators then they could ditch the fries/burgers...but not before!
There are lawsuits pending from shareholders of Nokia and even the most balanced shareholder of Nokia has to judge Elop on the results. If the 920 doesn't take off then his vision or plan has to be questioned and new CEO with a new vision must be put into place. This makes me nervous as a WP fan, but the CEO of Nokia must execute.
LUMIA 800 & Retail Shelving Problems
When Elop took over, some senior employees left the company or he directly replaced them with his choices. The problem with this approach is that these Senior employees took their knowledge, expertise and carrier relationships with them.
Let's take the US out of the equations with their 4 primary carriers. There are over 150+ carriers worldwide and Nokia lost a lot of relationships with these carriers when Elop brought his team over. The carriers did not want to stock Nokia Lumia 800 offerings. For 2 reasons....fear over Skype integrations and Microsoft.
In the Q2 2012 shareholder meetings, Stephen Elop admitted that retail sales staff were reluctant to sell the Lumia phones and he hasn't figured out how to overcome that problem. If carriers will not sell your phone...that phone line is doomed. This has happened to the 900 and 800 series of phones.
During this same shareholder meeting Elop, was stomped as to what to do with carriers not wanting to sell the lumia phones because of Skype integration and he replied
" If the operator doesn't want us, it doesn't want us. We will appeal to them with other arguments. We have more to offer to them. It is a good point to start the discussion from Skype."
Charlie Kindle, who used to be the Program Manager for WP admitted that MS carrier relationships were bad BEFORE WP and got even worse with WP7 saying MS poisoned those relationship in 2011. That's why I thought it was interesting that after Nokia September 5 press conference that Charlie Kindle had this comment after Nokia had no price or carrier information
If a carrier is serious about an OEM phone they will negotiate like they are serious."Lack of price means lack of seriousness by carriers."
Now before we easily dismiss Charlie as some ex microsoftie he did work with the carriers as his day job. I repeat...this was his J-O-B. So he knows about the negotiating that goes on behind the scenes and when he talks about pricing...it's not the $199.99 price you and I see...it's about the OEM pricing and how much the carriers are willing to cover.
Take the average smartphone, brand new it cost $199 + ETF (early termination fee) of $375 that means the carrier has $575 (worst case scenario) to pay to the OEM from the consumer. If the OEM charges less than $575 the carriers can make profit. If they charge more than that it, it cost them. This is why Sprint is in the hole with iPhone because their OEM price is $649,$749 and $849
Carriers will put up with this price because the iPhone is a subscriber switching phone..i.e people will switch to their carrier to get an iPhone (not sure if this is the case anymore in 2012 like it was in 2007). Other than that, carriers don't want to lose money and even want to make money by selling phones cheaper. This is what OEM and carriers argue about behind the scenes...not the $99 or $200 you and I see.
Nokia struggles in this area as they believe they are still a premium brand and their products are premium products but retailers disagree and so some retailer just don't push or gasp..even sell them. Hal Berenson another ex Microsoftie, repeats the same thing.
Microsoft's problems are with marketing and carriers
Nokia's were known for their imaging and reviews showed that the Lumia 800 did not have the differentiator(sp?) that Elop talked about so much. Their N8 offering had a 12mp camera with the more powerful XENON flash. Yet the Lumia 800 took several steps backwards from the N8 and the Carl Zeiss lens did show up in the real world.
Nokia wanted to price the 800 the same as the dual core, high res screen offering of iPhone and Galaxy phones and their familiar OS with their 100,000+ apps. So retailers (around the world) did not show case the Lumia 800. No shelf space means no sales. In the US carriers in the US flat out didn't want the device which meant poor sales in another region.
The Lumia 900 faced the same rejection (again think big picture...around the world) and even in the US AT&T rejected the 900 initially as it didn't have LTE. Nokia didn't have LTE b/c WP7 didn't support it. This required MS to scramble and add LTE support. Software issues was one of the causes for the delay for the Lumia 900 (HTC Titan II LTE enabled came out 2 months later than the original HTC Titan as it finally got LTE software support that was needed )
Skeptics among operators say the sleek, neon-coloured phones are overpriced for what is not an innovative product, cite a lack of marketing dollars put behind the phones, and image problems caused by glitches in the battery and software of the early models.
*note. Nokia is doing the same thing again with pricing their phones 920/820 near the same level as iPhone 5 and SIII while HTC is pricing theirs below the market leaders and this is causing problems for the carriers where they don't want to eat the cost but actually make...a profit.
Carriers don't want to eat the cost of selling a phone that is not perceived to be a technically equal to the market leaders so they don't want to sell a product that automatically puts them in the red. HTC understands this and quickly got 150+ carriers on board with offering while Nokia continues to struggle. In the US, There is still no announcements of carriers nor pricing...my guess, they are are still negotiating as of Oct 2nd.
HTC 8x
As an example, did it ever strike you as it being odd that on HTC release conference that they were publically able to state that had 150 carriers lined up in over 50 countries? Contrast that with silence from Nokia
LUMIA 900
The Lumia 900 was a desperate move on Elops part (opinion) and it should have came out in Nov/2011 not April 2012. Months had passed since the burning memo and the US still did not have a phone for sale ( 800 was a non starter ) So as CEO, Elop allowed the 900 to enter the market and this was doomed from the start. I say doomed because of the time to market problem. Tech savy consumers knew about the Apollo feature set in Jan 2012, Competitors had more advanced HW coming out SII,HTC One, iPhone 5 leaks were coming out so release a HW disadvantaged, SW disadvantage phone, MS had not properly advertised their OS up to that point, so releasing a phone in April 2012 was poor timing. It was simply release to late and besides the wow color factor. The camera was not Nokia wow. The iphone 4s still had a better camera.
BTW: I am a proud owner of a cyan Lumia 900
Lets work backwards for a moment:
- Sept 5th/2012 Nokia announced the Lumia 920 and from all reports the hardware was ready to go, but the software was not.
- June 2012, MS publicly announced that WP7 and WP8 were not going to be compatible forward/backward
- Jan 2012, video leaked w/Senior vice president and Windows Phone manager Joe Belfiore talking to partners at Nokia about WP8 features
- Nov, 2011 Samsung Focus S was introduced
- OEM were introducing dual core in Q4 2010,
- In 2009-2010, MS knew they were going to reboot Windows Phone as Steven Sinofsky did not like the current model and wanted a single kernel across the platform. Plus he did not like .NET
- Two large development teams were created @MS one for WP7 and WP8. WP7 was a stop gap until they could fulfill the requirements for WP8. MS could not allow another 2 years to go by with a mobile OS so I can understand the stop gap.
- It takes about 18-24 month for a phone to be developed from scratch. If reusing an existing design the time to market can be cut
Sales...they had to stop the blood. He bet the ship on WP8 and needed some sales or revenue to come in. I don't blame him if I were him (now as a customer sure I would blame him but as CEO...) He had to take the gamble and see if the 900 would take off. At&t promised hero status marketing even though it did not have hero status HW or software so they tried. Thats why the phone came out at $100 on contract and HE (gasped) even refunded $100 for early user of the phone because of quality problems (software i think) So the profits Nokia might have made on the phone were given given back to At&T as Nokia was in a panic state. They needed to get customers.
*Nokia will layoff 13,000 employee in 2013 to save money
*Nokia has to sell its HQ building and lease the building back to save money
Elops plan may work out and get more than 3.7million phone sales in 90 days with WP8, but what if it doesn't work out? Wouldn't that pragmatic approach be to diversify your portfolio? Wouldnt you at least think about a new leader?
What plan does Nokia have left, just wait to WP9? Give their phones away? I am not sure aand maybe MS is not sure either.
MS most favored CEO partner may be on his way out and MS needs a backup plan just in case the NEXT CEO looks at things differently.
Microsoft's Future
MS has to be a player in the mobile space as its critical to its future. Leaving their future to Samsung and HTC (who are heavy players in the Android space) is introducing a lot of risks into their future plans. They have to succeed or their future is dependent on selling Windows, Servers software and Office.
MS has seen the revenue from their mobile offering and there is not enough profit in this arena. Look at the expenses involved with WP...now look at the amount of revenue they generate from licensing their mobile OS compare to the revenue and profit from selling windows. I have heard (no hard proof) that mobile OS sells for $15/copy and desktop $85/copy. In terms of profits that's huge! Combine with a low market share (4%) and that's not a lot. At one point in 2010, MS was selling 1million copies of Windows 7/day! @$85/copy....that's $85millon/day!
Contrast that with Nokia having a 87% share of WP (Q2 2012 according to Kantar Worldpanel) and Lumia only selling 3.7 million copies means that only 4.25million copies of WP were sold in all of Q2 (90 days)
So my quick math tells me @ $15/copy X 4.25 million means they had revenues of $0.063billion for 90 days of sales. That's a lot to me or even a sports athlete but compared to the revenues from the Window division (Q2 2012 $4,740 billion) Dare I mention that's revenue...not profit! so out of the $63mil they have to pay for advertising (they gave Nokia $0.250 billion last qtr), salaries, licensing, research and development.
Now take a look at a different model. The low end iPhone cost $649 dollars. According to iSupply, it cost Apple $207 ( BOM and manufacturing ) for a difference of $442. Now lets take 1/2 (generous) of that amount to pay for R&D, salaries and advertisement and you still have $220 of pure profit from each iPhone and you can see why Apple generates massive profits each quarter.
Is it hard to fathom MS being envious of the margins Apple makes on each phone ($442 vs $15 ) and thinking it would be nice to get some of that? When you look at it this way, even if WP grabbed 30% of the market it still would not generate the revenue it would need to grow as the volume is just not there. But if it made HW it could generate the type of revenue it would need to continue to be a tech giant. Yes I know it's not a simple as that (ask dell, palm, HP and cough...Zune Hardware...Kin Phone ) but with $50billion in cash reserve wouldn't it be worth it to invest in the future of MS
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